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WRONGFUL DEATH-New Mexico Adopts Hedonic
Damages in the Context of Wrongful Death Actions:
Sears v. Nissan (Romero v. Byers)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sears v. Nissan,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
non-pecuniary value of a decedent's life is compensable under the New
Mexico Wrongful Death Act. 2 With the decision in Sears, New Mexico
joined a handful of jurisdictions that have ventured into the complex
and controversial maze of "hedonic damages" in wrongful death actions.
Hedonic damages are "[diamages awarded . . . for the loss of enjoyment

of life, or for the value of life itself, as measured separately from the
economic productive value that an injured or deceased person would have
had." 3 This Note explores the historical background of hedonic damages
in wrongful death actions, analyzes the rationale behind the Sears decision,
and discusses its possible ramifications.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jeffrey Sears, a thirty-year-old repairman, 4 died in a one-car collision
while driving his Nissan pickup truck.' Individually, and as personal
representative of his estate, his wife ("Plaintiff") brought a wrongful
death action in New Mexico federal district court. 6 Plaintiff alleged that
the Nissan Motor Company, Ltd. and the Nissan Motor Corporation in
USA ("Defendants") negligently designed, manufactured,
sold, assembled,
7
supplied, and distributed the decedent's truck.

1. 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994). The New Mexico Supreme Court consolidated its grant
of certiorari and acceptance of a certified question from the court of appeals in Romero v. Byers
with its acceptance of two certified questions from the federal district court of New Mexico in
Sears. In Romero, the court created a cause of action for loss of spousal consortium in New
Mexico. Id. at 424, 872 P.2d at 842. This Note discusses only the Sears portion of the consolidated
appeal.
2. Sears, 117 N.M. at 424, 872 P.2d at 842. In Sears, the court also held that loss of guidance
to minor children is a pecuniary injury under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act. Id. This Note
is limited to an analysis of the portion of Sears that addresses the issue of hedonic damages.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (6th ed. 1990). A number of synonyms exist for the term
"hedonic damages," including "loss of life damages," "loss of enjoyment of life damages," "damages
for the value of life itself," and "damages for the loss of life's pleasures." The Sears court avoids
the term "hedonic," which has engendered much controversy, by coining the phrase "nonpecuniary
value of life itself." Sears, 117 N.M. at 424, 872 P.2d at 842. For the sake of clarity, the author
often uses "hedonic damages" in place of the various synonyms.
4. Brief of the Association of Commerce and Industry of New Mexico at 3, Amicus Curiae,
Sears v. Nissan, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994) (No. 20,441).
5. Brief-in-Chief of Plaintiff at 2, Sears v. Nissan, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994) (No.
20,441).
6. Sears, 117 N.M. at 427, 872 P.2d at 845.
7. Brief-in-Chief of Plaintiff at 2, Sears v. Nissan, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840 (1994) (No.
20,441).
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At trial, Plaintiff sought to introduce the expert testimony of Dr.

Dillman, an economist.' Based on the decedent's age, his hourly wage
of $13.61, and the value of his household services, Dr. Dillman calculated
the pecuniary losses resulting from the death to be roughly $1,060,000. 9
In addition, Dr. Dillman offered testimony concerning the non-pecuniary
value of the decedent's life itself. 0 Defendants moved to exclude Dr.
Dillman's testimony on the subject of non-pecuniary damages.' At this
point, the federal district court certified the following question to the
New Mexico Supreme Court:
Does the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act and the language in SCRA
13-1830 permit Plaintiff to introduce expert testimony by an economist
for establishing a non-pecuniary value of life itself of the decedent
and be awarded
damages for the non-pecuniary value of decedent's
2
life itself?

On certification, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "the value
of life itself is compensable under our [Wrongful Death] Act.' ' 3 The

court reasoned that "just as the jury in a personal injury case must
determine the monetary worth of nonpecuniary losses, so too must the
jury in a wrongful death action determine fair and just compensation
for the reasonably expected nonpecuniary rewards the deceased would

have reaped from life.'

' 4

The court declined to rule on the question of

whether or not expert testimony is admissible for the purpose of proving
the non-pecuniary value of life, holding that that question "is a matter
best left to the rules of evidence of the applicable trial court."' 5
III.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Hedonic Damages Under State Law
Although every state has a statute that permits actions for wrongful

death,

6

state "[c]ourts generally have not held tortfeasors liable for the

8. Id. at 2-3.
9. Brief of the Association of Commerce and Industry of New Mexico, Amicus Curiae at 3,
Sears (No. 20,441).
10. Id. at 4. Dr. Dillman's economic model would have provided the jury with two "benchmark"
values of life: a "low-end" value (cost of maintaining a prison inmate) and a "high-end" value
(cost of maintaining an intensive care patient for an extended period). Id. When multiplied by the
decedent's life expectancy, Dr. Dillman's "benchmarks" fixed the non-economic value of the
decedent's life somewhere between $1,038,000 and $13,083,000. Id.
11. Brief-in-Chief of Plaintiff at 1, Sears (No. 20,441).
12. Sears v. Nissan, 117 N.M. 422, 427, 872 P.2d 840, 845 (1994) (citations omitted). The New
Mexico Supreme Court "may answer by written opinion questions certified to it" by federal courts.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). The certified questions must involve propositions
of New Mexico law for which "there are no controlling precedents in decisions of the New Mexico
[Slupreme [C]ourt or the New Mexico [C]ourt of [Alppeals." Id.
The federal court also certified an additional question involving the compensability of loss of
guidance and counseling to minor children under the Act. Sears, 117 N.M. at 427, 872 P.2d at
'845. This question is beyond the scope of this Note.
13. Sears, 117 N.M. at 424, 872 P.2d at 842.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 429, 872 P.2d at 847.
16. MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES in TORT AcTIONS § 20.00 (1991). American jurisdictions enacted

Winter 1995]

SEARS V. NISSAN

value of the decedent's life in wrongful death actions."'' 7 Until Sears,
"only Connecticut, among all the states . . . held that hedonic damages

[were] recoverable under a state wrongful death statute. ' "'8 State courts

that reject hedonic damages rely on the actual language of their respective
statutes, as well as general policy considerations.' 9
1. State Wrongful Death Statutes and Hedonic Damages
Because "[tihe right to recover damages for wrongful death is entirely
statutory,' '20 the availability of hedonic damages under a state wrongful
death statute depends on what type of statute the state has. In general,
there are three types, of wrongful death statutes: 21"survival" statutes,
"wrongful death" statutes, and "hybrid" statutes.
Survival statutes allow any claims that a person could have brought
during his or her lifetime to survive the person's death. 22 Quite simply,
survival statutes limit recovery to damages for injury that occurs before
death. Thus, under a survival statute, a plaintiff representing the decedent's estate may recover any damages that the decedent could have
recovered if he or she had lived, such as medical expenses and pain and
suffering between the date of injury and the date of death (ante-mortem
damages). 23 Consequently, survival statutes probably preclude post-mortem

these statutes soon after the passage of the Fatal Accidents Act (or Lord Campbell's Act) in England
in 1846. Id. No cause of action for wrongful death existed at common law. Id.
17. Erin A. O'Hara, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away
With Murder?, 78 GEo. L.J. 1687, 1706 (1990).
18. Spencer v. A-i Crane Service, 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994); see generally Lloyd R.
Cohen, Toward an Economic Theory of the Measurement of Damages in a Wrongful Death Action,
34 EMORY L.J. 295, 306 (1985). One prominent case in which Connecticut recognized the availability
of hedonic damages in wrongful death actions is Estate of Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 (Conn.
1976).
It is important to note, however, that many states, including New Mexico, allow hedonic damages
in personal injury cases. See, e.g., Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990) (victim of
catastrophic brain damage could recover for loss of enjoyment of life as it related to disability and
pain and suffering); Collins v. Perrine, 108 N.M. 714, 720, 778 P.2d 912, 918 (1989) (child who
suffered brain damage could recover for loss of enjoyment of life).
19. See Southlake Limousine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
hedonic damages are not available under Indiana's wrongful death statute); Willinger v. Mercy
Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978) (instruction on hedonic damages for death
of child due to medical malpractice constituted reversible error); Spencer v. A-I Crane Service, 880
S.W.2d 938, 943-44 (Tenn. 1994) (court properly refused request for instruction on hedonic damages
for death of man killed in construction accident); Wooldridge v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash.
1981) (shortened life expectancy of man killed in automobile accident was relevant only to the
extent that it related to his future earning capacity).
20. Stang v. Hertz Corp. 81 N.M. 69, 72, 463 P.2d 45, 48 (Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, 81 N.M.
348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970), rev'd, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972) (citing Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M.
468, 379 P.2d 765 (1963)); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2-1 to 41-2-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
21. MINZER ET Ax., supra note 16, § 20.10.
22. Id. For example, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (1994) provides: "All causes of action
by a person or persons against another person or persons shall survive to the personal representatives
of the former and against the personal representatives of the latter."
23. MINZER ET AL., supra note 16, § 20.12. Some survival statutes, however, may also enumerate
the categories of damages that are or are not available in wrongful death actions. Under the
Washington survival statute, for instance, a plaintiff can recover for the "pain and suffering, anxiety,
emotional distress, or humiliation" of the deceased only on behalf of certain enumerated beneficiaries.
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hedonic damages for wrongful death,24 because loss of the value of life
itself necessarily occurs after death.
Unlike survival statutes, wrongful death statutes create a new cause
of action that arises upon the death of the victim. Thus, wrongful death
statutes allow recovery for any damages resulting from the death itself
(post-mortem damages). 26 Some wrongful death statutes measure damages
in terms of loss to the decedent's beneficiaries, while others measure the
loss to the decedent's estate. 27 Loss of enjoyment of life is an injury to
the decedent, rather than to the decedent's beneficiaries. Therefore, "lossto-the-beneficiaries" statutes theoretically preclude hedonic damages for
wrongful death. 28 "Loss-to-the-estate" statutes, on the other hand, do
not appear to bar post-mortem hedonic damages. 29 Presumably, injury
to the decedent's estate could include the post-mortem loss of the decedent's ability to enjoy life.3 0

REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (Cum. Supp. 1995). The Washington Supreme Court rejected
hedonic damages under an earlier version of the statute, which prohibited recovery for the pain
and suffering of the deceased. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (1988); Wooldridge v. Woolett,
638 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash. 1981) (rejecting hedonic damages as "a backdoor method for obtaining
compensation for pain and suffering").
24. Yet, some jurisdictions with "survival" statutes allow hedonic damages between the date of
injury and the date of death. Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1244-45 (11. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that loss of enjoyment of life of decedent is a "relevant consideration in determining
damages for pain and suffering").
25. M1NZER ET AL., supra note 16, § 20.13. For example, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (1994)
provides: "Whenever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by the negligence or
wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the death from the person who caused
it.'
26. MINZER ET AL., supra note 16, § 20.13.
27. Id.
28. Southlake Limousine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting hedonic
damages and noting that the "sole inquiry" under the Indiana wrongful death statute is "how
many dollars are necessary to compensate the beneficiaries for the pecuniary loss caused to them
by the wrongful death?").
29. Some loss-to-the-estate statutes, however, enumerate the categories of damages that are
available in wrongful death actions. Exhaustive lists may preclude hedonic damages. Andrew J.
McClurg, It's A Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 96-97 (1990). For example, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-113 (1994) provides:
the party suing shall, if entitled to damages, have the right to recover for the
mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and necessary expenses resulting to the
deceased from the personal injuries, and also the damages resulting to the parties
for whose use and benefit the right of action survives.
In Spencer v. A-I Crane Service, 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 57, 96-97 (1990)), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the exhaustive list of categories
"appears to absolutely preclude the recovery of hedonic damages."
30. Connecticut's wrongful death statute is a loss-to-the-estate statute; it allows the executor or
administrator of a decedent's estate to recover "just damages." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555
(1991). The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that the phrase "just damages" is broad enough
to include damages for "the destruction of [the victim's] capacity to carry on and enjoy life's
activities in a way [he or] she would have done had [he or] she lived." Estate of Katsetos v. Nolan,
368 A.2d 172 (Conn. 1976). Connecticut courts have allowed juries to determine hedonic damages
on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 183; Waldron v. Raccio, 353 A.2d 770, 775-76 (Conn. 1974).
Juries may consider various "factors" in order to determine how "'pleasurable' the decedent's
future might have been "if he or she had lived." Id. at 775 (upholding award of $75,000 where
decedent had "obtained joy and satisfaction from his active family life," had "energetically pursued
several hobbies," and had been "a happy and well-adjusted individual.").
WASH.
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Finally, hybrid statutes combine features of both survival and wrongful
death statutes. 3 In other words, hybrid statutes allow for the survival
of causes of action belonging to the decedent prior to death as well as
for a cause of action arising from the death itself. This dual nature
raises problems in terms of hedonic damages. The survival aspect of 3a2
hybrid statute seems not to allow hedonic damages for wrongful death,
while the wrongful death aspect seems to indicate that they are available.33
Consequently, hybrid statutes present an internal contradiction, which
may lead to confusion in judicial interpretation.
2. General Policy Considerations
States also reject hedonic damages in wrongful death actions for policy
reasons.3 4 For example, some courts reason that hedonic damages are
contrary to the "compensatory" function of tort law.35 Compensatory
damages attempt "to restore the tort victim as nearly as possible to the
position he would have been in had injury not occurred." '3 6 In a wrongful
death case, however, no amount of money can bring the decedent back
to life.37 In addition, despite the recent availability of economic models
that place monetary values on human life, some courts have also concluded
that hedonic damages are "too speculative to form a basis for computing
damages."38 Furthermore, hedonic damages may also overlap other types
of damages, such as pain and suffering, raising problems of double
recovery.3 9 Finally, courts may reject hedonic damages "out of fidelity
to a reluctance to demean human life by placing
to precedent," 4 or due
4
a "price tag" on it.1
Hedonic Damages in § 1983 Civil Rights Actions
Although hedonic damages for wrongful death are not available in
most states, several federal circuits have experimented with hedonic dam-

B.

31. MINZER ET AL., supra note 16, § 20.10. The New Mexico Wrongful Death Act isan example
of a hybrid statute. See infra note 61.
32. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Some states with hybrid statutes, however,
have allowed recovery for loss of enjoyment of life of a decedent between the date of injury and
the date of death. See Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
33. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
34. McClurg, supra note 29, at 66-71; O'Hara, supra note 17, at 1706-12.
35. See Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188, 1190 (Pa. 1978); Spencer
v. A-I Crane Serv., 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994).
36. McClurg, supra note 29, at 66.
37. Id.
38. See Southlake Limousine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Spencer, 880
S.W.2d at 943. Many commentators have attacked economic models for valuing human life as
unreliable. See, e.g., Eric J. Guerin, Pandora's Damages and the Undoing of Tort Reform: An
Argument Against the Recovery of Hedonic Damages Under Michigan's Wrongful Death Act, 1
DET. C.L. REV. 77, 115 (1992); McClurg, supra note 29, at 100-06.
39. Wooldridge v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash. 1981).
40. O'Hara, supra note 17, at 1711-12.
41. Id. at 1710-11.
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ages in the context of § 1983 civil rights actions. 42 Section 1983, 4 3 in
conjunction with § 1988," provides a basis for hedonic damages in cases
that involve the unconstitutional deprivation of life45 under color of state
law. Under § 1983 and § 1988, federal courts have relied on compensatory
and deterrence theories to justify hedonic damages. 6
In Sherrod v. Berry, for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld an award of hedonic damages based solely on the compensatory
purpose of § 1983.47 In Sherrod, a police officer wrongfully shot and
48
killed a nineteen year-old African-American man at point blank range.
After hearing expert testimony regarding the hedonic value of human
life, the jury awarded $850,000 in hedonic damages. 49 The trial court
upheld the verdict, noting that the purpose of § 1983 is to "compensate
' 50
persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of Constitutional rights.
The court reasoned that "[tihe deprivation of life that is prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment includes . . . deprivation of the pleasures of
life. ' 5' Accordingly, the court concluded that the expert economic testimony "enabled the jury to perform its function in determining the
' 52
proper measure of damages.
Other federal courts have focused on the deterrent purpose of § 1983
in awarding hedonic damages. 53 In Roman v. City of Richmond, police
officers wrongfully shot and killed two men. 54 The jury in Roman included
"deterrence" damages in its wrongful death .award, 5 and the trial court

42. See, e.g., Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding instruction on "loss
of life" damages where prisoner died as a result of medical malpractice); Linzie v. City of Columbia,
651 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (allowing parents to seek damages for "loss of life" of daughter
killed by police officers); Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. II1. 1985) (upholding award
of hedonic damages where man was shot and killed by police officer), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th
Cir. 1987), vacated, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1988); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (upholding award of
"deterrence" damages where two men were shot and killed by police officers).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 imposes liability on "[e]very person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia," deprives another person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the United States. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Under § 1988, a federal court must look to the law of the state
in which it sits whenever federal law is "deficient" in "furnish[ing] suitable [civil rights] remedies,"
unless state remedies are "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Id.
45. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I provides: "[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
46. McClurg, supra note 29, at 85.
47. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
48. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. I11.1985), aff'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
1987), vacated, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.
1988).
49. Id. at 160.
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 164.
53. See e.g.,
Linzie v. City of Columbia, 651 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Bass v. Wallenstein,
769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
54. 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
55. Id. at 1556-57 n.l. The jury awarded $1.5 million for each victim. Id. at 1555.
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upheld the verdict. The court noted that the "deterrence of future Constitutional violations is an important function of § 1983. ' '56 Relying on
§ 1988, the trial court found that California state remedies, which did
not provide for deterrence damages, were inconsistent with the deterrent
purpose of § 1983.1 7 Thus, the court concluded that plaintiffs were "not
limited to the damages provided by state law,"5' 8 and that "[d]eterrent

damages [were] an appropriate remedy." 5 9
In sum, some federal courts have awarded hedonic damages in § 1983

civil rights actions. Using § 1988 to avoid the constraints of state remedies,
they "fashion ... appropriate remed[ies] that will fulfill the purposes
of § 1983." 6
C.

Wrongful Death Damages in New Mexico Prior to Sears

1. The New Mexico Wrongful Death Act
The New Mexico Wrongful Death Act 6 ' is a hybrid statute. First, the
Act resembles a survival statute. Under § 41-2-1, a tortfeasor is liable
for wrongful death if his or her "act, neglect, or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages in respect thereof."'6 2 In other words, the

56. Id. at 1557.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held
that "substantial damages [in § 1983 actions] should be awarded only to compensate actual injury
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of
rights" (emphasis added). In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310
(1986), the Court noted that § 1983 does have a deterrent purpose. The Court found, however,
that "damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations."
Id. Thus, pure "deterrence damages" are probably inappropriate in § 1983 actions. McClurg, supra
note 29, at 87. Accordingly, federal courts often tie the compensatory and deterrence purposes of
§ 1983 together to justify hedonic damages. Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding Illinois law inconsistent with both the "compensatory and deterrent purposes underlying
section 1983").
60. Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 to 41-2-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). Sections 41-2-1 and 41-2-3, respectively, provide:
[wihenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another .. . and the act, neglect, or default, is such as would, if death
had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who ...
would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
[e]very such action .. . shall be brought by . . . the personal representative ...
and the jury in every such action may give such damages, compensatory and
exemplary, as they shall deem fair and just, taking into consideration the pecuniary
injury or injuries resulting from such death to the surviving party or parties entitled
to the judgment ... and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect, or default.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1, -3 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). Section 41-2-3 provides an order for distribution
of a wrongful death award to listed beneficiaries, and also provides the means for distribution in
the absence of any listed beneficiaries. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff can only recover those damages that the decedent could have
recovered if he or she had lived (ante-mortem damages). Thus, the survival
to allow hedonic damages occurring
aspect of the Act does not appear
63
after the death of the decedent.
Second, the Act resembles a wrongful death statute. Section 41-2-1
creates a new cause of action for wrongful death. 64 This cause of action
accrues at the date of death. 65 Moreover, the Act contains attributes of
both the loss-to-the-beneficiaries and the loss-to-the-estate types of death
acts discussed above. 66 For example, § 41-2-3 refers to the "surviving
The decedent's benparty or parties entitled to the judgment .... ,,67
eficiaries actually receive the proceeds of a wrongful death award, according to the order of distribution set forth in § 41-2-3 .68 Section 412-3, however, allows a jury to award "fair and just [damages], taking
into consideration" the loss to a decedent's beneficiaries. 69 The phrase
"taking into consideration" suggests that pecuniary loss to a decedent's
beneficiaries is only one element of a wrongful death award. Thus, the
loss-to-the-beneficiaries aspect of the Act does not seem to bar other
types of post-mortem damages, such as post-mortem hedonic damages.
In addition, section 41-2-3 allows all damages that are "fair and just"
and provides a means for distribution of a wrongful death award in the
absence of any listed beneficiaries. 70 This section seems to allow damages
for any post-mortem injury to the decedent's estate, which could include
post-mortem hedonic damages.
2. New Mexico Case Law
The hybrid nature of the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act has caused
a great deal of confusion in the New Mexico courts. 7' Since the passage
of the Act in 1882,72 the New Mexico Supreme Court has struggled to
determine whether the Act is a survival statute or a wrongful death
statute, and to define the scope of wrongful death damages under the
Act. 73 To date, the struggle has created more confusion than resolution.
63. The survival aspect of the Act, however, does not appear to bar hedonic damages between
the date of injury and the date of death. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
66. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992); Stang v. Hertz Corp.
81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970), rev'd, 83 N.M.
730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
72. 1882 N.M. Laws ch. 61, § 3.
73. The court has gradually expanded the types of damages that are available under the Act.
See, e.g., Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 30-31, 63 P.2d 540, 548-49 (1936) (pecuniary loss to
statutory beneficiaries not a prerequisite to recovery); Kilkenny v. Kenney, 68 N.M. 266, 270, 361
P.2d 149, 155 (1961) (juries may award damages for pain and suffering of deceased between time
of injury and time of death); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 241, 501 P.2d 673, 685 (1972)
(pecuniary loss includes loss of services performed by decedent); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 467,
797 P.2d 246, 256 (1990) (juries may consider 'mitigating or aggravating' circumstances in setting
compensatory damages").
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In Cerrillos Coal Railroad Co. v. Deserant, the territorial supreme
court characterized the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act as a loss-tothe-beneficiaries wrongful death statute. 74 The Cerrillos court limited
wrongful death damages to "compensation for the pecuniary loss" to a
decedent's beneficiaries. 75 The court articulated a formula for estimating
loss to the beneficiaries: "from proof as to age, earning capacity, health,
habits, and probable duration of life, the jury shall say what is the
present worth of the life of deceased." ' 76 The Cerrillos court essentially
77
viewed wrongful death damages as a "cold question of dollars."
In Hogsett v. Hanna, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court recharacterized the Act as a loss-to-the-estate wrongful death statute. 78 In
Hogsett, the court upheld an award of $15,000 for the wrongful death
of a physician, 79 despite the lack of evidence of pecuniary injury to his
statutory beneficiaries. 0 The court held that "substantial damages are
recoverable ... [in wrongful death cases] without actual proof of loss
[to a decedent's beneficiaries]."'" Thus, the Court modified the Cerrillos
measure of wrongful death damages: in all cases, the proper measure is
"the present worth of [the] life of the deceased [to the estate]" 82 as
determined from "proof as to age, earning capacity, health, habits and
probable duration of life." 83
The New Mexico courts first began to struggle with the inherent
contradiction between the survival and wrongful death aspects of the Act
4
In Stang, a nun died in an automobile accident.8 5
in Stang v. Hertz Corp.1

74. 9 N.M. 49, 67 (1897).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 68. The court also held that juries could not consider "mitigating or aggravating
circumstances" in the context of compensatory damages. Id. Juries could, however, consider "aggravating circumstances" in deciding whether to award punitive damages. Id.
77. Id.
78. 41 N.M. 22, 31, 63 P.2d 540, 549 (1936). The court found that the Act was a survival
statute because: 1) § 41-2-3 provides for distribution of a wrongful death award in the absence of
statutory beneficiaries, 2) § 41-2-3 lists the beneficiaries in an arbitrary priority, rather than according
to actual loss suffered, 3) § 41-2-1 provides for damages in "every such case" and 4) the purpose
of the Act involves "more than compensation. It is intended . . . also, to promote safety of life
and limb by making negligence that causes death costly to the wrongdoer." Id, at 30, 63 P.2d at
548.
Some language in the opinion, however, suggests that the court also viewed the Act as a survival
statute. Id. at 27, 63 P.2d at 545. The Court apparently regarded the survival aspect of the statute
as a prerequisite to liability, unrelated to the issue of damages: "[t]he first inquiry [in a wrongful
death action] is whether the injured party would have had a cause of action against the defendant
... had death not ensued." Id.
79. Id. at 24, 37, 63 P.2d at 542, 555. Dr. Hogsett died after falling through a doorway in
the floor of a garage. Id. at 24, 63 P.2d at 542.
80. Id. at 26, 63 P.2d at 544. Although Dr. Hogsett had considerable financial worth, his
statutory beneficaries were his parents. Id. His parents did not suffer any pecuniary loss as a result
of his death. Id.
81. Id. at 31, 63 P.2d at 549 (quoting withdrawn opinion in Valdez v. Azar Bros., 33 N.M.
230, 246 P. 962 (1928)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 22, 28, 63 P.2d at 540, 546.
84. 81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14 (1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
85. Id. at 71, 463 P.2d at 47.
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Because she had taken a vow of poverty, her beneficiaries suffered no
pecuniary loss as a result of her death. 86 Nevertheless, the New
Mexico
87
Court of Appeals decided to allow wrongful death damages.
Like the Hogsett court, the Stang court characterized the Act as a
loss-to-the-estate wrongful death statute.88 Thus, the Stang court found
that the measure of damages for wrongful death was "the present worth
of life of decedent to the decedent's estate." 8 9 The court held that
pecuniary injury to a decedent's beneficiaries was only one factor for a
jury to consider. 9° The court also stated that "pecuniary injury [itself]
is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages," suggesting that a plaintiff
can recover more than just pecuniary damages in a wrongful death case. 9'
The Stang court, however, contradicted itself by characterizing the Act
as a survival statute, under which "the damages recoverable are those
that the person injured could have recovered if that person had not
died. "92 This language seems to limit wrongful death recovery to antemortem damages. 93
The New Mexico Supreme Court only added to the confusion in Solon
v. WEK Drilling Co., in which it classified the Act as a survival statute. 94
In Solon, the parents of a man killed in a drilling rig accident sought
to intervene in an wrongful death action brought by his personal representative. 95 In dicta, the supreme court stated that the proper measure
of wrongful death damages is the "value of the decedent's life, which
the decedent himself would have been able to recover had death not
ensued."'96 The Solon rule completely contradicts itself. The language of
Solon classifies the statute as a survival statute, thereby limiting recovery
to ante-mortem damages. Yet, Solon suggests that a plaintiff can recover
damages for the "value of the decedent's life," a post-mortem loss.
After over one hundred years of conflicting and often confusing decisions, the New Mexico courts failed to resolve the inherent contradiction
between the survival and wrongful death aspects of the New Mexico
Wrongful Death Act. Under Stang, the wrongful death aspect of the Act
seems to allow post-mortem non-pecuniary or hedonic damages. Yet under
both Stang and Solon, the survival aspect of the Act seems to prohibit

86. Id.
87. Id. at 76, 463 P.2d at 52.
88. Id. (citing withdrawn opinion in Valdez v. Azar Bros., 33 N.M. 230, 246 P. 962 (1928)).
The court relied largely on the reasoning in Hogsett. See supra note 78.
89. Id. at 72, 463 P.2d at 48 (Ct. App. 1970). This language in Stang seems to limit wrongful
death damages to pecuniary loss, such as lost wages. The New Mexico UJI supports this conclusion.
Under the UJI, one element of damages for wrongful death is "the monetary worth of the life of
the deceased," as determined by "age, earning capacity, health, habits, and life expectancy." N.M.
UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1830 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
90. Stang, 81 N.M. at 72, 463 P.2d at 48.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 78, 463 P.2d at 54 (emphasis added).
93. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could recover damages for the pain and suffering
of the deceased between the date of injury and the date of death. Id. at 79, 463 P.2d at 55.
94. 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992).
95. Id. at 567, 829 P.2d at 646.
96. Id. at 568, 829 P.2d at 647.
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post-mortem hedonic damages. Until Sears, however, the court did not
address the issue of whether non-pecuinary or hedonic damages were
available under the Act. 97
IV.

SEARS: RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS

In a brief opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided in Sears
that hedonic damages are available under the New Mexico Wrongful
Death Act. 9 The Sears court left the actual calculation of damages to
juries on a case-by-case basis; yet, the court failed to provide any
meaningful guidelines for placing values on human life itself.
The Sears court noted that the Act allows "all damages that are fair
and just," 99 "taking into consideration" pecuniary injury to the decedent's
beneficiaries.'0 The court noted that 'taking into consideration' . . . is
not a limiting phrase, but indicates that more than the single factor of
pecuniary loss should be considered ... to determine fair and just
compensation."' 0'1 Following Stang, the Sears court found that pecuniary
injury is not a prerequisite to wrongful death recovery.' 0 2 Accordingly,
the Sears court reasoned that nonpecuniary, or hedonic, damages were
available under the Act.' 0 a
Like the Stang court and the Solon court, however, the Sears court
contradicted itself by implicitly holding that the New Mexico Wrongful
Thus, the court found that a plaintiff
Death Act is a survival statute.
can recover those damages that "the decedent himself would have been
entitled to recover had death not ensued."' ' The Sears court failed to
address the concern that the survival aspect of the Act prohibits postmortem hedonic damages for wrongful death.
Although the Sears court decided to allow hedonic damages under the
Act, it set forth few guidelines for actually measuring the value of human
life. The court stated that

97. But see Ortega v. Plexco, 793 F. Supp. 298, 299 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that hedonic
damages are unavailable under New Mexico law).
98. Sears v. Nissan, 117 N.M. 422, 424, 872 P.2d 840, 842 (1994). The court left the issue of
the admissability of expert economic testimony to "the rules of evidence of the applicable trial
court." Id. If trial courts allow expert economic testimony, a wide range of economic models will
provide "benchmark" values of life for juries in wrongful death cases. See generally McClurg,
supra note 29, at 100-06 (explaining the two basic economic models for valuing human life: the
"human capital" approach and the "willingness-to-pay" approach). It is unclear, however, whether
trial courts in New Mexico will actually decide to allow such testimony. Courts in many other
states have excluded expert testimony on the value of life, on the basis that it invades the province
of the jury. See, e.g., Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Southlake
Limousine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
99. Sears, 117 N.M. at 428, 872 P.2d at 846.
100. Id. at 427, 872 P.2d at 845.
101. Id. at 427-28, 872 P.2d at 845-46.
102. Id. at 428, 872 P.2d at 846.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court favorably cited language in Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 829
P.2d 645 (1992), which referred to the Act as a survival statute.
105. Sears, 117 N.M. at 428, 872 P.2d at 846 (quoting Solon, 113 N.M. at 568, 829 P.2d at
647).
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[j]ust as the jury in a personal injury case must determine the monetary
worth of nonpecuniary losses, so too must the jury in a wrongful
death action determine fair and just compensation for the reasonably
expected nonpecuniary rewards the deceased would have reaped from
life as demonstrated by his or her health and habits.'06
The court delineated two aspects of nonpecuniary damages that make
up 'fair and just' compensation. Pain and suffering devolves from 1)
that which the victim must newly endure and 2) that which the victim
may no longer enjoy."' 0 7 The court also stated that the proper measure
of damages is "the worth of the deceased's life had he [or she] continued
to live."'' 0 In sum, Sears allows the jury to determine the value of human
life itself on a case-by-case basis, using ordinary personal injury principles.
The Sears court did not recognize, or at least did not acknowledge, that
the task of placing a monetary value on human life itself has serious
moral and ethical implications. 10 9
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF SEARS

The issue of hedonic damages for wrongful death is complex and
controversial. Thus, it deserves close judicial scrutiny. In Sears, the New
Mexico Supreme Court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
language of the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act, New Mexico case
law, or possible methods for measuring hedonic damages. Furthermore,
the court gave no insight into the policy behind its decision. Overall,
the Sears opinion reflects the court's reluctance to delve too far into the
controversy that has surrounded the issue of hedonic damages.
On the positive side, the Sears decision may result in increased deterrence
of acts that lead to wrongful death and larger wrongful death awards
for low-income victims. First, one purpose of the New Mexico Wrongful
Death Act is to "promote the safety of life and limb by making negligence
that causes death costly to the wrongdoer.""' 0 The adoption of hedonic
damages in Sears may help to protect all members of society against
negligent conduct by creating a potentially large liability in every wrongful
death action."' Second, prior to Sears, it was possible that a tortfeasor
would pay very little for the death of a low-income victim." 2 By allowing

106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
110. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 351, 467 P.2d 14, 17 (1970), rev'd on other grounds,
83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
111. Hedonic damages may have a particularly strong deterrent effect on businesses and professionals, especially those dealing with a low-income clientele. See McClurg, supra note 29, at 73.
112. Under a similar approach to wrongful death damages, the Supreme Court of Washington
upheld a jury award of only $2,339.51 for the wrongful death of a twenty-two year-old man killed
in an automobile accident. Wooldridge v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 571 (Wash. 1981). The award
represented funeral and burial expenses. Id. at 568. The court noted that the decedent's job history
was "spotty," that he had no savings, and that he had little more than a high school education.
Id. at 571.

SEARS V. NISSAN

Winter 1995]

juries to consider more than an individual's economic productivity, Sears
may result in higher wrongful death awards for low-income victims.
The Sears decision, however, also creates several serious problems.
First, a case-by-case determination of hedonic damages could result in
excessively high wrongful death awards."' Second, an ad hoc determination of the value of human life seems undesirable from a moral and
ethical standpoint. Hedonic damages differ from other types of damages
traditionally left to the jury, such as emotional distress, pain and suffering,
or even loss of enjoyment of life due to injury. A hedonic damage award
in a wrongful death action actually represents the worth of the decedent
as a human being. An ad hoc approach presupposes that some human
lives are worth more than others and actually allows courts to put the
value of a decedent's human life on trial." 4 Finally, the lack of clarity
in Sears will probably create confusion in the lower courts, thus increasing
the number of appeals in wrongful death cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Jeffrey Sears' accident took from him "what all the wealth in the
world could never purchase":" 5 the pleasure of being alive. In an attempt
to redress this injury, the New Mexico Supreme Court has adopted hedonic
damages in the context of wrongful death actions. While the Sears decision
may result in increased deterrence of wrongful conduct and higher wrongful death awards for low-income victims, it may also result in excessive
wrongful death awards, an ad hoc approach to the valuation of human
life, and confusion in the lower courts. Overall, the complex problems
that may stem from the Court's adoption of hedonic damages admit to
no easy solution."16

CINDY DOMINGUE-HENDRICKSON

113. Particularly, in the case of wealthy decedents, juries will be able to award hedonic damages
over and above already large pecuniary loss awards.
114. Potentially, Sears could create a "judgment day" scenario in the lower courts. "[Wlitnesses
could be dragged into court testifying as to whether a particular decedent was happy or unhappy,
what he did in his spare time, what personality traits he possessed . . . [and] what his consumption
O'Hara, supra note 17, at 1708.
patterns indicated about his enjoyment of life ....
115. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
116. There is little agreement-among courts and commentators as to whether hedonic damages
should be available, and if so, how to measure hedonic damages. For an introduction into the
maze of hedonic damages, see Cohen, supra note 18 (advocating hedonic damages and outlining a
possible method of life valuation); Guerin, supra note 38 (arguing against adoption of hedonic
damages under the Michigan Wrongful Death Act); McClurg, supra note 29 (arguing that hedonic
damages are necessary to deter wrongdoing against lower-wage earners in society and advocating a
fixed legislative sum for hedonic damages in all wrongful death actions); O'Hara, supra note 17
(arguing that hedonic damages are necessary to deter wrongdoing and advocating a "willingness to
pay" approach to measuring such damages).

